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Abstract—Power system operation considering an 
increasingly complex cyber infrastructure may be one of the key 
factors of the next generation power systems. The effective 
operation of a power system in a massively deployed cyber 
network environment will be affected by cyber network reliability. 
Therefore, it is vital not only to understand the operation of a 
cyber network and its reliability, but also it is critical to integrate 
the interdependency of cyber and power systems into power 
system planning and operations. This requires a three-layer 
approach to reliability modeling and evaluation. The cyber and 
power layers are interconnected by the information layer. The 
objective of this paper is to define the three-layer model and report 
a generalized framework for combined reliability modeling.  
Keywords—cyber-physical power system; dependent system 
reliability modeling; cyber reliability; cyber-intrusion 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modernization of the power system has gained substantial 
momentum in the last decade. As part of this modernization, 
automation and increased dependency on real-time tools are 
expected to improve power delivery [1]. This requires the 
availability of information and communication technologies at 
every level. For example, at the bulk level, grid operators can 
replace preventive control actions by corrective actions on the 
basis of grid visibility and real-time control actions. 
Distribution system operations can be improved by aggregators 
establishing virtual power plants with contracted distributed 
resources and end-user appliances to optimize their behavior 
according to price and control signals.  
The objective of the power system is to supply the entire 
load on a system at all times [2] and a measure of fulfilling this 
objective is defined as reliability. The communication and 
decision tools are expected to improve the reliability of the 
power system. This should be achieved by both increasing the 
speed of reaction and improving preventative decisions in the 
anticipation of abnormal events. 
The resulting system combining power and cyber layers is 
known as the cyber-physical power system (CPPS), and the 
availability of communication and decision tools will affect the 
reliability of the power network. The emerging CPPS is much 
more complex than traditional power systems, and traditional 
methods for assessing its reliability needs to be reviewed [3]. 
Traditional power system reliability modeling and 
evaluation considers the failure of various components as 
independent events. Communication and decision tools can be 
sources of failure for the following reasons: 
x Component Failure: Both cyber and decision tools, such 
as routers and servers, can fail. When this happens, 
communication may be interrupted, or decisions may not 
be made appropriately in the power system operation, thus 
affecting power system reliability.  
x Cyber Unavailability: Even without physical failure of 
cyber equipment, communication may not be interrupted 
due to packet loss, link unavailability, and packet delay. 
This could negatively affect the decision process, thereby 
deteriorating power system reliability.  
x Cyber Intrusion: Malicious manipulation of information 
could disrupt the decision process. Therefore, the effect of 
cyber intrusion on power system reliability needs to be 
incorporated.  
Contrary to the power carrying components, 
communication and decision equipment cannot be modeled as 
independent components. For example, a communication link 
failure could result in multiple sensors not being able to send 
real-time information to decision centers, thereby resulting in 
an impact on decisions made by the control center. Therefore, 
cause-effect modeling could be utilized to model the CPPS by 
evaluating the following: (i) threats: external factors that could 
impact the reliability of the CPPS, (ii) vulnerability: the extent 
to which threats will affect the power system operation, and (iii) 
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consequence: impacts to power system customers [5]. 
Reliability modeling and evaluation of the future power grid 
must take all of these into consideration.  
The objective of this paper is to suggest approaches that 
could facilitate the reliability modeling and identify future 
needs. Different methods used in interdependent CPPS 
modeling for power system reliability computation are 
summarized in this work. Component-level and system-level 
reliability evaluation approaches are presented, and the future 
needs for CPPS reliability modeling along with industry 
standards, as defined by the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC), are identified.  
II. CYBER-POWER SYSTEM MODEL 
The need for sensors, communication, and real-time 
decision making are intensifying in order to meet future needs, 
especially those involving system automation. In addition, 
external information affects, directly or indirectly, the control 
decisions of the power system. To better understand the 
interconnected complex CPPS network, a multi-dimensional 
heterogeneous system similar to [6] can be utilized, the 
framework for which is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1: Framework for cyber-physical power system 
The CPPS-based analysis focuses on whether decision-
making functions are performed to enhance the performance of 
the power system. For better understanding the interaction, 
three heterogeneous layers are utilized. The middle layer, 
consisting of the communication network, sensors and 
actuators bridges the decision-making (control) functions (top 
layer) and the physical power systems (bottom layer). The 
operational decision functions (EMS, protection, stability 
control, AGC/AVC, etc.) are included in the model through the 
top decision layer. The following subsections provide details 
for each layer: 
A. Power (Physical) Layer 
The power layer, which consists of all physical devices 
(e.g., generators, power lines, transformers, circuit breakers, 
power electronic devices, energy storage, loads, smart 
appliances, etc.), is connected to the communication and 
coupling layer through state awareness (sensors) and command 
execution devices. Conventional reliability modeling 
techniques can be used to model reliability of the power layer. 
B. Communication and Coupling Layer 
The communication and coupling layer is composed of 
interface devices (e.g., remote terminal units-RTU) and a 
communication network. The measurement from the power 
layer and the control command to the power layer are both 
carried by interface devices. The decision-making functions in 
the decision layer are also carried by these devices. The 
communication network, which connects the interface devices, 
consists of various communication devices and the links 
between them. The failure or malfunction of the interface 
devices and communication network will impact the accuracy 
of the decision-layer functions. Therefore, modeling the impact 
of communication and coupling layer is key for effectively 
operating a CPPS. 
To illustrate the importance of the communication and 
coupling layer, synchro-phasor measurement units (PMUs) are 
considered as an example. PMUs, which are installed in 
selected buses [7] for providing related measurements, are used 
to monitor the entire power grid operation. By building on this 
infrastructure, potential smart grid applications, such as real-
time stability management [8], can be facilitated [9]. To 
guarantee power system reliability, it is very important to 
maintain a certain degree of redundancy in terms of the 
placement of PMUs in order to address their random failures. 
For example, a primary and backup (P&B) method proposed in 
[9] involves two independent sets of PMUs, both of which can 
provide full observability of the entire power grid. In order to 
ensure that PMU data is useful, it is also important to improve 
the freshness of acquired data; thus, a stringent latency (time 
delay) requirement is involved. Delay in the arrival of 
measurements could result in lowering the value of data and 
potentially impact grid performance. However, time delay 
cannot be avoided in practical communication systems, 
including both wireless and wired systems [11]. In addition to 
the component failure, the delay in data arrival beyond the 
threshold and data loss should be considered as data 
unavailability for reliability modeling purposes. 
Another illustrative example is the supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) system, which relies on information 
and communication systems [12]. SCADA interface modules 
can be treated as part of the communication and coupling layer 
for reliability modeling, with similar issues in terms of failure 
and data unavailability.  
C. Decision Layer 
The decision layer contains a variety of functions (e.g., 
renewable generation control, energy management system, 
demand management, etc.), which are desired for seamless 
operation of a power system. Estimated conditions of operating 
states from real-time measurements are used for this purpose 
[13]. Failure of the decision tools, including servers, will affect 
power system reliability.  
Furthermore, the modernization of the grid involves 
automation via a communication infrastructure. An attacker 
  
with malicious intention may launch cyber-attacks by hacking 
a few sensors and distort the measurements. Moreover, 
communication links are vulnerable to false data-injection 
attacks, where measurements may be altered during data 
transmission [14]. This could lead to incorrect decisions that 
can cause major malfunctions or even a blackout. It is important 
to model the malicious data injection into the network and 
ensure that it is not utilized in decision processes [15].  
In addition to failure of the decision equipment, correctness 
of the decision can also affect power system reliability. The 
effect of cyber intrusion on power system decisions must be 
considered as a decision error for reliability modeling purposes.  
Based on the discussion about each CPPS layer, reliability 
modeling for the heterogeneous framework could be modeled 
as shown in Fig. 2. This state transition diagram shows the 
different possible states of each layer. It should be noted that 
the power system is a combination of these three layers. 
Therefore, a detailed modeling is needed to include all possible 
states. This kind of modeling can be done at the component 
level or at the system level.  
 
Fig. 2: Framework for cyber-physical power system reliablity modeling 
III. CYBER UNAVAILABILITY VS. VULNERABILITY 
A. Cyber Unavailability 
Communication may undergo a forced outage, even if the 
communication and coupling layer components are operating. 
This could occur for several reasons, including signal 
attenuation, loss of communication packet, time delay in 
communication packets, or jitter. Fig. 3 shows such forced 
outages for four different PMUs at different times in a day 
during a four-minute window from a U.S. utility [16].  
 
Fig. 3: Data unavailablity from different PMU units  
From Fig. 3, it can be seen that the forced outage duration is 
typically shorter than a power equipment failure. However, the 
frequency of occurrence is relatively very high. Based on PMU 
data from 261 units for a 13-month period, the average rates are 
provided in Table 1.  
TABLE 1: MISSING DATA STATISTICS 
Data Availability  0.96 
Missing Data Rate 3.22 failures per day 
Recovery Rate 0.36 second 
Based on this data, the frequency of missing data is very 
high compared to the power component failure. One of the 
challenges here is that the missing data rate does not follow an 
exponential distribution. It is important to further investigate 
and develop appropriate data unavailability model. Fig. 4 shows 
the missing data rate for certain PMUs.  
 
Fig. 4: Missing data rate for different PMUs in system 
Furthermore, even for a single PMU, the missing data rate 
is not constant as shown in Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 5: Missing data rate for sample PMUs 
Since the missing data rate is not consistent with different 
PMUs, it is critical to further analyze the data outage and 
develop more reasonable models for CPPS reliability analyses.  
B. CyberAttack Modeling 
Malicious intrusion into the cyber infrastructure has the 
ability to affect control decisions in power systems. Cyber 
intrusion could occur through either communication and 
coupling layer or the decision layer. However, for the purpose 
of efficient reliability modeling, the cyber intrusion needs to be 
modeled as a part of the decision error.  
Cyber-attacks can be classified as follows: 
x Availability: An attack may impact data availability by 
interfering with the original source or its transmission, for 
example, due to loss of communication (which includes 
detected data corruption). 
x Integrity: Attacks to data integrity are those that could 
result in undetected modification and insertion of data. 
This could cause anything from data corruption to remote 
control of breakers. 
x Confidentiality: Data confidentiality is compromised when 
data are accessed without permission. This usually has no 
direct impact on power system performance, but the threat 
to long-term performance is substantial. This includes 
reconnaissance attacks, which observe weak points in the 
cyber infrastructure, or attempts to intercept passwords and 
encryption keys. Also, leaks of privacy-sensitive material 
may result in severe regulatory consequences. 
The models for cyber security (malicious attacks initiated 
on the cyber infrastructure) are presented in [17]. The most 
  
common analytical method applied to cyber security threat 
models is the concept of the attack tree [18]. Attack trees work 
backwards from a goal that the attacker wishes to achieve, by 
identifying steps that lead to that goal. By assigning 
probabilities to the rate or probability of initial threats and the 
transitions, an attack graph is constructed, which can be 
analyzed numerically.  
The threat of an intelligent attacker makes it difficult to 
deduce which specific threats are imposed to a model. It is also 
difficult to assign probabilities to the successful exploitation of 
vulnerabilities. As a result, risk modeling is often done using a 
high-level conceptual model such as the ISO/IEC Common 
Criteria standard. Recently, the domain-specific modelling 
language CySeMol [19] was developed as an alternative that 
allows better expression of causal relations and the likelihood 
of transitioning between attack steps.  
CPPS constitute both discrete and continuous control and 
operational decisions, which are best captured by a hybrid 
control model [20]. Hybrid control models capture the normal 
operation of power systems, which can be used to detect attacks 
or anomalies on the system [20], [20]. 
An analytical framework using a generalized stochastic 
Petri net model is proposed in [22] to quantify vulnerabilities of 
the SCADA system for cyber security investigations. It 
systematically evaluates the SCADA vulnerabilities at three 
levels: system, scenarios, and access points. Then 
vulnerabilities are computed using the steady-state probabilities 
that the SCADA system is attacked through specific access 
points and the impact factors.  
A modified semi-Markov process is used in [23] to model 
cyber-attacks against a substation. The success probabilities 
and mean time to compromise are calculated using the Colonel 
Blotto game [23]. Bayesian attack graphs are used in [24] to 
model attack procedures and quantitatively evaluate the 
probabilities and average frequencies of successful attacks. 
IV. CYBER-POWER RELIABILITY MODELING 
A Single failure in the communication and coupling layer 
or the decision layer could affect multiple devices in the power 
layer. Therefore, it is critical to model the sequence of 
consequences from events in the communication and coupling 
layer or the decision layer to power system layer failures. 
Steps in the reliability computation process should include:  
i. Model the communication and coupling or decision layer 
event propagation using section III.  
ii. Develop an interdependency framework for the impact of 
communication and coupling layer or decision layer events 
on power system components (a transition from a sequence 
of cyber events to power layer events) 
iii. Using the interdependency framework, determine the 
power system reliability matrices.  
The following sections describe the modeling of parts ii 
and iii: 
A. Cyber-Power Interdependacy Modeling 
Because of the dimensionality and complexity, it is 
difficult to directly incorporate cyber components into the 
power grid reliability evaluation. A methodology that 
decouples the analysis of the cyber part from the physical part 
with the use of a cyber-physical interface matrix (CPIM) has 
been proposed in [25]. The CPIM can be described as follows. 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑀 = ൦
𝑝ଵ,ଵ 𝑝ଵ,ଶ ⋯ 𝑝ଵ,௡
𝑝ଶ,ଵ 𝑝ଶ,ଶ ⋯ 𝑝ଶ,௡
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑝௠,ଵ 𝑝௠,ଶ ⋯ 𝑝௠,௡
൪ 
where, rows correspond to various scenarios of the cyber 
component failure, and columns correspond to scenarios of 
physical failures. Elements of the matrix are the probabilities of 
interface events. The probabilities are therefore conditional 
probabilities of physical outcomes, given a specific initiating 
event. As a result, the probabilities in each row (or column) add 
up to 1. With this methodology, reliability analysis is first 
performed at the substation level to evaluate cyber failures and 
their impact on the physical system. Such impact is summarized 
as probabilities in the CPIM. The cyber components do not 
directly appear in the matrix. The matrix summarizes the 
probability of possible causes and outcomes.   
The resulting CPIM is utilized in the transmission system-
level reliability evaluation without the need to consider cyber 
configuration details. In practical applications, another matrix 
called the consequent event matrix (CEM) is used to identify 
the specific physical components affected in each event. An 
implementation on the extended Roy Billinton Test System 
(RBTS) has been presented in [26]. The results clearly show the 
impact of cyber failures on power grid reliability. Studies in 
[25] and [26] mainly focus on the aspect of protection because 
protection hidden failures are common causes of cascading 
outages [27], [28]. A similar conditional probability matrix was 
used in [29] to model the effects of failures in generation 
rejection schemes, and to determine their impact on optimal 
system operation.  
B. Component-Level Modeling 
Component-level modeling requires a better understanding 
of the cyber power interaction. A general framework for cyber 
power interaction has been developed in [26] using the concept 
of smart components. Here, the power layer and the 
communication and coupling layer are combined to develop the 
smart component. In the work presented in [26], the decision 
layer is included with the communication and coupling layer. 
The electrical equipment could be in four states (normal, failed, 
preventive, and maintenance), and the communication layer has 
three states (normal, failed, unavailable). Markov model for the 
smart component with state transition rates is shown in Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 5: State model for smart components [30] 
  
This model needs to be further enhanced to incorporate the 
cyber unavailability and cyber-attack to better represent the 
communication and coupling layer and the decision layer. One 
of the challenges of the CPPS state model is the higher number 
of possible states. Once the state model is developed, it is 
necessary to develop reduced state models for computational 
effectiveness. Due to the dissimilarity in the operation of the 
smart components, a single framework will not be sufficient. 
For example, the communication and coupling layer and the 
decision layer have a dissimilar impact on a device used for 
health monitoring compared to real-time measurements.  
C. System-Level Modeling  
Enhanced component models demand improved CPPS 
reliability modeling and analysis. Two approaches are proposed 
in the literature.  
The first approach is to use a combined state-space model 
for each component and then evaluate the power system 
reliability [31]. Several communication and coupling layer 
devices could fail for the same reason. The work presented in 
[31] uses common-cause failure (CCF) based probabilistic 
reliability assessment. Two main factors are required for a CCF 
to occur: a root cause and a coupling factor that makes multiple 
components susceptible to the same cause. The set of 
equipment affected by a single cause is known as the common 
cause component group [31]. A probabilistic method similar to 
the alpha factor model [32] can be used to determine 
simultaneous failure probability of an equipment. A four-step 
approach to determine a component failure rate with basic event 
probability of occurrence is presented in [31]. This method 
needs to be further improved for the large system analysis.  
The CCF power system reliability analysis requires the 
following considerations: (i) the probability of a large number 
of components failing for a single cause is low, and (ii) when 
an event occurs in the power system, the component close to 
the event will act first, and if it fails, then the adjacent 
components will react 
In the case where exact power system reliability is 
impossible to determine, the worst-case reliability can be 
computed [33]. Minimal cut sets for data transmission from one 
node to another can be computed. In order to reduce the 
complexity, the worst-case probability can be determined by 
placing all minimal cut sets in a series [33]. This method is very 
useful for very large networks.  
The second approach uses the characteristic matrix 
method. Similar to [25], the characteristic matrix for both the 
communication and coupling layer and the decision layer can 
be modeled. For the communication and coupling layer, 
element (i,j) of the interface matrix corresponds to the 
performance of cyber-link between nodes i and j and given by  
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The diagonal elements in C correspond to the performance 
of the node. Each element is comprised as cij = (T, Pa, Pm), 
where T is the time delay, Pa is the interruption probability, and 
Pm is the disruption probability. The decision-layer interface 
matrix will be represented by S. Each element comprises S = 
(T, P), where T is the delay, and P is the decision error 
probability. Similar to the communication and coupling layer, 
the diagonal elements correspond to the device performance. If 
there are no connections, then all elements are zeros (cij = (0, 0, 
0) or Sij = (0, 0)). Similarly, the interaction between layers can 
be modeled using the interface matrix, which can be used for 
reliability computation.  
V. ENHANCING RELIABILITY STANDARDS 
Power system reliability modeling requires a modification 
to its standardization due to the complexity of CPPS. The 
enhancement to monitoring, control, and protection through 
CPPS changes the means of failure and recovery of power 
system components. Both bulk and distribution system 
reliability modelling must be changed.  
A. Bulk Industry Standards  
The planning and operation of bulk power systems have 
been traditionally driven by reliability criteria and standards 
(NERC standards, regional reliability criteria) [34]. The North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation has developed 
mandatory and enforceable standards for planning (e.g., TPL-
001-4) and operation (e.g., TOP-002-4, IRO-017-1) to ensure 
reliable operation of the power grid. Critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP) standards (e.g., CIP-002-5), which deal with 
the cyber side of the power system, are mandatory and 
enforceable [34]. 
Developed methodologies and tools to assess system 
performance have served the industry very well in the past [35]-
[37]. However, it is becoming more apparent that reliable 
operation of the power system is highly dependent on the 
reliability of the associated cyber system, and failure in the 
cyber system can result in undesirable consequences. New 
reliability tools for joint modeling and performing the reliability 
analysis by taking into account the performance of “cyber” and 
“physical” elements are needed. Contingencies on the cyber 
side may lead to inappropriate control commands, which will 
influence the physical power system. 
B. CPPS Standadization Approach  
In addition to the power system failure and recovery 
measures, it is vital to determine the direct effects of the CPPS 
on power system operations. Some of the measures that could 
quantify the direct effect of CPPS on the power system are 
identified in the literature [1], [38]–[39]. Some examples are 
presented as follows.  
The effect of the cyber infrastructure on power system 
reliability can be modeled similar to IEEE Std. 1366 [40] based 
on the following indices proposed by [1]: 
x Average Cyber Failure Frequency Index: The number of 
missed decisions on the power layer due to failure of the 
communication and coupling layer and the decision layer 
as a fraction of the total decision: 
𝐴𝐶𝐼𝐹𝐼 =
Total missed decsions
Total decisions in a unit time
 
  
x Energy Not Served due to Cyber Failure: The amount of 
energy not served due to failure of the communication and 
coupling layer and the decision layer as a fraction of the 
total energy not served at the same time:  
𝐸𝑁𝑆஼ =
Total energy not served due to missed decisions
Total energy not served in a unit time
 
On the other hand, indices for specific applications should 
be developed. For example, when the power system operations 
are managed via the CPPS, transient stability of the system 
could be detected via the measurements. The ability to detect 
the transient stability against faults is developed in [38] as part 
of the power system reliability evaluation.  
x Expected Transient Instability Index: The measure for the 
probability of the system being in an unstable state: 
𝐸𝑇𝐼 = ෍ 𝑝൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௨ൟ
௡ೠ
௜ୀଵ
 
 where 𝑝൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௨ൟ  is the probability of the 
system being unstable while transitioning from state 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ 
to state 𝑥௜ , 𝑥௜  is the system new state, 𝑋௨  is the set of 
unstable transitions (𝑋௨ ⊂ 𝑋), 𝑋  is the set of all system 
states, and 𝑛௨ is the number of unstable transitions. 
x Expected Transient Stability Robustness Index: The 
measure of the ability of a system to withstand the 
following fault events: 
𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑅 = ෍ 𝑝൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௦௧ൟ. 𝐸𝑀൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௦௧ൟ
௡ೞ೟
௜ୀଵ
 
where 𝑝൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௦௧ൟ  is the probability of the 
system being stable while transitioning from state 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ to 
state 𝑥௜, 𝐸𝑀൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௦௧ൟ is the energy margin of a 
stable transition from state 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ to state 𝑥௜, 𝑋௦௧ is the set 
of stable transitions (𝑋௦௧ ⊂ 𝑋), and 𝑛௦௧  is the number of 
stable transitions. 
x Expected System Risk of Instability Index: The measure of 
the risk of a system being unstable against fault events: 
𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐼 = ෍ 𝑝൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௨ൟ. ห𝐸𝑀൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௨ൟห
௡ೠ
௜ୀଵ
 
where ห𝐸𝑀൛𝑥௜ିଵ,௜: 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ ∈ 𝑋௨ൟห is the energy margin of an 
unstable transition from state 𝑥௜ିଵ,௜ to state 𝑥௜. 
VI. FUTURE NEEDS  
Cyber-physical interdependencies exist extensively in 
various aspects of the power grid. To further enhance existing 
reliability evaluation models and methodologies, considerable 
research effort and input from both academia and industry are 
needed. 
Two challenges for improved reliability analysis of the 
CPPS are as follows: (i) test systems that allow standardization 
of results and (ii) simulation tools that address the needs of 
modeling CPPS interactions.  
A. Test Systems 
The IEEE Reliability Test System [41] and the Roy 
Billinton Test System [42] are used for modeling and analysis 
of power system reliability. However, due to the lack of 
appropriate failure models for cyber- and decision-layer 
equipment, the authors use customized models, which limit the 
ability to compare the CPPS reliability framework. The 
following need to be incorporated into the test systems:  
x Possible states for communication and coupling-layer 
equipment, 
x Possible states for decision-layer equipment,  
x State transition rates for new states from communication 
and coupling layer and also the decision layer, 
x Cyber-physical interface matrix model.  
B. Simulation Tool 
Software developed for the power system domain is rarely 
flexible enough to enable customization using complex 
modules. A notable exception for distribution system analysis 
is the open-source package GridLAB-D [43]. Since this is an 
open-source software, the reliability analysis component could 
be incorporated. Simulation tools should allow users to 
incorporate possible communication architecture and decision 
schemes because they are critical for effective reliability 
calculations. Two separate models for an interconnected 
transmission system and possible extension to a software tool, 
such as GE MARS, are necessary. Similarly, the second model 
should focus on the distribution system reliability computation.  
It is vital that the simulation tools should be able to model 
seven layer OSI communication model, associated 
vulnerabilities, and possible defense mechanism including 
different possible communication and data exchange protocols. 
C. CPPS Resiliency 
In extreme events, it is not possible to keep up the 
reliability of power grids and the emphasis changes to enhance 
the grid resiliency. Keeping the power on to critical facilities 
such as hospitals and fire department during extreme events is 
essential and, additionally, the ability of the system to supply 
power to the critical loads can be defined as resiliency.  
It is important to analyze the impact of possible cyber-
attacks on the power grid and develop defense mechanisms. 
Cyber-physical resiliency analysis needs to be performed to 
minimize the impact of the potential cyber-attacks on the grid.  
Similar to CPPS reliability, there is a need for formal 
metrics to quantify resiliency of the CPPS and a tool to study 
the cyber-physical resiliency. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
This paper summarizes the current status and needs for 
cyber-physical power systems reliability evaluation. It is 
essential to standardize the CPPS modeling for reliability 
computation based on three layers: power layer, 
communication and coupling layer, and decision layer. The 
possible states of each model and the interaction between layers 
can to be captured using an interface matrix, for example. It is 
also vital to develop test systems and simulation platforms to 
enhance future CPPS reliability studies to benefit the industry.  
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